COBBETT'S WEEKLY POLITICAL REGISTER.

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" Whilst there are the same advisers, we must expect the same advice; whilst there are the same " counsellors, we must expect the same results; and a change of men alone will not do; it is but the " first step to our happiness; the *principles*, or maxims, of state must be removed. It is not taking away " this or the other man, and putting in another to act by the same rules, that will cure our disease; " but it is the *change of principles that must do it.* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * " I think it is very plain, that, till these principles are removed from Whitehall, all our labour and " pains will end in nothing. The way, then, as I conceive, to do this, is, to lay before His Majesty the " state of the case; let us show him how unable these men are to serve him, and how destructive to his " interest it is to follow their advices."——Mr. BOOTH's Speech, in the House of Commons, against *Favourites*, in the reign of Charles II. See Parliamentary History, Vol. IV. page 1268.

SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

CHANGE OF MINISTRY.——The speech, from which I have taken my motto for the present Number, should, at this moment, be read by every man in the kingdom. In more than one respect the present situation of this kingdom, bears a strong resemblance to its situation at the time when this excellent speech was made; and, our members of parliament, those, I mean, who are independent, will find in this speech sentiments and language worthy their adoption and imitation.——Then, as now, it was not so much a change of *men*, as a change of *principles*, a change of maxims and rules of government, that was wanted; or, at least, it was not solely a change of men that would have done any good. The advice of MR. BOOTH was not followed. There was, in spite of the complaints of the people, *no change of principles*; all change was resisted, and, as often as possible, the advocates of such change were persecuted and punished. *Force*, of one sort or another, was employed for the purpose of stifling the voice of truth and justice. But, what did it finally effect? Why, the renewal of those bitter and loud complainings which at last, it was attempted to put a stop to by the bayonet; and, then, in a twinkling, away went the whole thing.——There is no man who will attempt to deny, that our present situation is a most alarming one. Ask any man of sense, what he thinks will be the result of the present contest; and, no matter of what party he may be, he will, at best, tell you, that he cannot even guess at that result. He will tell you, that he *hopes*, that we shall still remain an *independent nation*; but, he will hardly state any *grounds* of such hope.——Now, if this be the case; if this be the prevalent state of mind through the kingdom, does it not become us to consider well what is the *cause* of it? The answer of some will be; " Why, the cause of it is *the power of Buo-* " *naparté.*" This is true, as far as it goes; but, what has been *the cause of Buonaparté's having so much power?*——The state of the case is this: England and France had, for centuries, been rival nations. Many, previous to the year 1793, had been their wars and their negociations. Many their struggles for the upperhand in the affairs of Europe. But neither seemed to prevail much over the other. Sometimes France appeared to be rather uppermost and sometimes England; but, still the *rivalship* continued; and, as to England's *fearing* her rival, the idea never entered into any man's mind. The contest was always for some *colonial* or *commercial* or *continental* object. But now, our rulers themselves tell us, that the contest is, on our part, for *existence as a nation.* Not for honour, not for glory, not conquest; no, nor for self-defence, in the usual sense of that word; but, for *existence.* Yes, they are not ashamed to tell us plainly, that they have brought us into such a state, that it is become a question *whether we shall continue an independent nation or become the slaves of the sovereign of France.* This question is undisguisedly stated in parliament as well as out of parliament, and it was reserved for this time to state it; for never was it stated before, since England was England. ——Well, then, ought we not to suppose, that there is something wanting in the principles, upon which our rulers, since 1793, have acted? There has no change taken place in the geographical situation of England and France: the countries lie where they did formerly; their physical means of defence and of offence are what they formerly were; and, of course, all that France has gained, she has gained by superiority of moral means. It

is in vain to tell us, that her means have been of an *extraordinary* kind; for, the answer to such an observation, is, that *we* should have employed extraordinary means also. France began a revolution, and our government set their faces against that revolution. The revolution took place, and, as our rulers chose to set their faces against it, it was for them to be prepared for all the effects of the resentment of the revolutionists.——No disturbance has, at home, been given to any of the schemes of our rulers. Opposition to those schemes have frequently been attempted, but it has never succeeded. They have, in short, done just what they pleased, as to the raising of money and the expending of money. Their partizans have always contended, that what they did was right. Their opponents have contended, that most of their measures were bad, and that they proceeded upon wrong principles. The result is, that these rulers themselves now tell us, that the contest is become, at last, a contest for our very existence as a nation, while no man pretends to believe, *that France is in any danger at all from us.*—— This is a most humiliating confession. We are exposed to great danger from France, and France to none from us. We would fain have peace; but France will not give us a peace in which we shall have a moment's safety. Our war, as we have long been told, is a war *purely defensive*. Our government first undertook to correct French principles; next it undertook to repress French ambition; next it undertook to repel French aggression; but, it has long been content to confine its expressed hopes to the keeping of the French out of England; to preserve itself and the people from the yoke of the Emperor Napoleon, so long the object of the *ridicule* of all good Anti-Jacobins, who, to secure his degradation, thought it quite sufficient to publish his private letters and expose his *bad spelling*.——A contest for existence may sometimes be honourable for both parties, or, at least, not disgraceful to either. But, it is when the existence of *both* is at stake.——How cheerless, how heart-sinking, must that contest be, in which *my* existence is at stake, and in which I openly confess that my adversary, supposing him to be disappointed in all his views, is still in no danger? France could to-morrow give us a peace, which our government would be well satisfied with, not only without any humiliation on her part; but without causing the world to believe, that she could not have subdued us if she had chosen to continue the contest.——Again, therefore, I ask, whether the principles, upon which our government has acted, for the last seventeen years, must not be wrong? And, whether it be not absurd to suppose, that out of our present state we can be brought by *a mere change of ministers*, without any change of the principles upon which ministers act?——A correspondent (who does not give me leave to publish his letter) asks me, if "it would be doing nothing *to grant the reasonable prayer of the Irish Catholics.*" As this is, at this time in particular, a subject of great national interest, I shall answer the question fully and explicitly.——I have always, since I obtained a true account of the state of Ireland, been of opinion, that to grant what the Catholics now ask for is necessary; but, that, to grant them that, without granting more, would produce little effect. Since, however, this question was before agitated; namely, in the spring of 1807, circumstances have materially altered. Spain and Portugal were then tributary to France and very much harrassed by her; but, the sovereigns of those countries were upon the throne, and their ports were not at the command of France. Now, if I were to predict, that the whole of the Peninsula will be in the hands of Napoleon, in the space of eight or ten months from this day, I should, I dare say, be most violently abused by all those, whose business it is to delude the public. I will, therefore, argue hypothetically; I will merely, for argument's sake, suppose the thing *possible*: not *likely*, but merely possible. And, upon such a supposition, I hardly need point out to my readers (I am sure I need not point out to Buonaparté) the great increase of means, which he will possess *of invading Ireland*. It is a well-known fact, that, of all the ports of Europe, those of the Southern Peninsula are most favourable for such an undertaking; and, there is, I believe, no man, who is at all acquainted with naval affairs, who will not acknowledge, that, if we had ten times as many ships as we now have, it would be next to impossible so to guard the outlets and inlets, for any length of time, as to prevent a fleet of French ships from finding their way to Ireland, supposing the Peninsula to be wholly and safely in the possession of France. Supposing, then, that Napoleon should obtain this

possession, and supposing that he should have the means of making ships, in which I have before shown that he will not be wanting, we need not ask, *whether he will have troops for the service*, seeing, that, his work once accomplished in Spain and Portugal, the difficulty with him will be and must be, how to find *employment* for his troops. His is that sort of situation, that requires war. For years to come war will be necessary to him. The inordinate love of glory, inherent in Frenchmen, will be continually craving. It must be satisfied, or it will turn into contempt of him who fails to satisfy it. So that, even if we could suppose, that he, whom we are incessantly accusing of ruthless ambition, will, for our sakes, cease to be ambitious, the moment the pursuit of his ambition becomes greatly dangerous to us, whom he must hate more than all the world besides; even if we could suppose, that, when in possession of the best means, he will, all at once, want the will to endeavour to annoy and to conquer us; even if we could lay this flattering unction to our souls, we must perceive, that he would be pushed on against his will. In short, it is, I think, quite impossible to believe, that, when he has made himself master of the Southern Peninsula, he will not set systematically to work to invade and to conquer this kingdom. ——The reader will, I hope, without hesitation, exclaim: "aye, but he will never "succeed!" I hope such is the sentiment of every soul of us. But, if we think that he will make the attempt, it is surely wise in us to consider of our means of resistance. I like to hear men speak boldly upon the subject; but I like to hear them *reason* as they speak. I remember that in the year 1803, there was no small panic prevailed through the country: the flotilla at Boulogne caused the people in London to stop each other in the streets; it is notorious that many persons removed from the coast nearest France, taking their valuables with them: nay, why need I state circumstances to prove the then-prevailing dread of invasion, when we have upon record the official documents relative to the preparations for *fortifying the cities of London and Westminster*.——All this shows, that we are vapouring, when we treat the idea of invasion with contempt. And, if invasion was a thing not to be despised in 1803, when Buonaparté was merely *First Consul*; when Prussia was unbroken; when Austria was unbroken; when Italy was unsubdued; when Russia was actually ready to join us in the war, and did join us in the war; when Spain and Portugal, though tributary, were still formidable to France; and, which is not the smallest circumstance, when the port of Antwerp contained neither ships nor arsenal: if invasion was not a thing to be despised, nay, if it was a thing to be dreaded, and greatly dreaded, *then*, what is it *now*; when, with the exception of the Southern Peninsula, the whole of the continent of Europe has been subjugated by our enemy, or is his ally?——If we look back as far as the year 1803, we shall find, that, since that time, every power on the Continent, not then dependent on France, has been, by us, raised up against our enemy. That enemy has beaten them all. Our ministers have all along told us, that, by our money, paid away in *subsidies*, we were, *in the most effectual manner*, carrying on war against our enemy. Of these means we have employed a great mass. Many and many a million of money have the people of these kingdoms toiled for, and have then seen it given to foreign nations by way of subsidy. Well, then, if this was "the *most effectual* manner of carrying on "war against our enemy;" if this was so, is it not now time to look about us?—— Because the flotilla is no longer seen sailing along the coast of France, is it, therefore, supposed, that the flotilla is annihilated, and not to be revived? The contrary is well known. It is well known, that the boats and all belonging to them, are preserved with the greatest care, ready to be drawn forth upon any occasion; and who can doubt, that that occasion will soon be found, when the affairs of the Peninsula are settled, supposing them to be settled to the liking of Napoleon? From *the flotilla itself*, there could not be much danger; but, the flotilla must be attended to, and that alone will require a considerable naval force. Antwerp will have, indeed she has, her fleet of ships of the line and of frigates; the Texel, Rochfort, Brest, Ferrol, Lisbon, Cadiz; each will have its fleet in one year from this date; and, it is to be observed, that the forming of these fleets will, where it is required, greatly facilitate the work of subjugation, and will, indeed, tend to reconcile the people to the rule of the new dynasty. All this while *no new taxes* will be necessary in France; and, as to Spain and Portugal, the people there would experience *great relief*; because the heavy and odious imposts, founded on ex-

clusive privileges, would be abolished, and because a great part of the fruit of the people's labour, which is now swallowed up by those who do nothing, would remain for the use of those who perform that labour.——This is a very material consideration; for, if the war continue many years longer, it is manifest, that the mere effects of its duration upon the distribution of property, in *this country*, must produce something very serious. It has, in fact, done so already; it has made great progress in the shifting of property; and it is daily going on. Napoleon has nothing of this sort to apprehend. France knows nothing of paper-money. There is nothing fictitious in her currency or her wealth. Her land yields more than she wants both for eating and drinking. Scarcely any part of her population now look for employment or for gain beyond her own European dominions. The wants of luxury are daily diminishing, because luxury itself is almost banished from the land. And, as to *commerce*, we have, for now more than two years, exerted all our mighty means in an endeavour to ruin France by cutting off her commercial connections; and, what is the result, why, that she has become *more and more powerful.* —— If we, from these reflections, and many other that might be offered, believe that Napoleon has very dreadful means of invading this kingdom, and has the hearty good will to employ those means, it becomes us seriously to consider on the means that we have of resisting him. What are our means? Let me not be answered by *hopes*. Let me not be told, that it is *to be hoped* his fleets and flotillas will be met at sea, and there beaten. They *may* be; but they *may* not. Too many persons are apt to talk of blockading a port as they talk of stopping up a rat's hole, or a rabbit's bury. But, the sea is a wide place; and, perhaps, it is always an even chance, that, once in every month, at least, every blockaded fleet has a chance of getting out. Besides, is it *possible* for us to blockade all the ports from the Texel to Genoa, inclusive? The idea is absurd.——Well, then, supposing Napoleon to send out, at one and the same time, troops from the Texel, the Scheldt, Rochfort, Brest, Ferrol, Lisbon, Cadiz, Toulon, and Genoa, with orders to sail *for Ireland*. I see, for my part, nothing more easy than this. Nay, I think, that some such expedition will be necessary to him. Some of his ships, and even many of them might, and, doubtless would, be met by our naval force, and, in all probability, would be taken, or destroyed. But, is it to be believed, that *a part* of them would not reach their destined port in safety? Nay, is it to be believed, that, seeing that he would menace England with his flotilla, while he was pushing out his fleets for Ireland, *great bodies* of his forces would not stand a fair chance of landing in the latter country? —If I am answered in the affirmative; if I am told, in the language of poet Fitzgerald's odes, that "the Corsi-"can's legions would be *annihilated* the "moment they set their foot upon this *blest* "shore;" if this be the answer, I have, of course, nothing further to say. But, if the reader thinks, with me, that it is not only possible, but probable, that, in such a case, a French army to a very considerable amount would land in Ireland, he will not fail to be deeply interested in the question, *How, in such a crisis, the people of Ireland would be likely to act?* This, of all the questions that can now be agitated, is by very far the most interesting to all those, who are anxious for their country's independence. —— I shall not give any opinion of *my own* upon the state of the public mind in Ireland. I shall merely state, what is, indeed, almost too notorious to need stating at all, namely, that the people of Ireland now *live* under a law, called the *Irish Insurrection Bill*; that this law was passed on the ground of its *absolute necessity*; that it was declared, in the House of Commons, at the time of passing this bill, that "there had been "held, in Ireland, treasonable meetings, "for the purpose of *organizing a force to* "*assist the French*, and that it was *certain*, "*that there was a French party in Ireland.*" Upon this ground it was, that that law was passed, under which the people of Ireland *now live*.——Is not this a fearful state of things? Ought not every means, in the power of our rulers, to be used, and that speedily, for the purpose of rendering this law unnecessary? What those means are it would, perhaps, be not very difficult to point out; but, in my next, I shall endeavour to show how, in one respect, at least, the Irish might be conciliated. I allude to the measure against which the abominable cry of *No Popery* was raised; and which I think myself able to prove, beyond all contradiction, to have been one of the most unprincipled attempts that ever was made, to impose upon the ignorant and the thoughtless. It is now the time

to discuss this question fully. It is time to show to the people of England *for what* their very political existence is to be kept in jeopardy. Ireland safe, we might laugh at the conqueror; and let us, therefore, see, *why* it is that Ireland is not safe.

Lord Wellesley is, then, returned! Come back, and that, too, without beating Napoleon; aye, and without having had an opportunity of *facing* him! "Why," some one will say, "did he not remain, "then, till the opportunity offered?" Yes, to be sure, there is something in that.—— The most noble Marquis has always, by his partizans, been held up to us as the *only* man able to meet Buonaparté. Like Buonaparté, he was a great conqueror; had made kings and princes bend the knee before him; and, it was supposed, that the circumstance of climate made no difference. When, therefore, the news was first announced, that our Eastern Hero and Statesman was about to be sent to Spain, the paragraph grinders in the Nabob's Gazette were all on tip-toe, and the pensioned poet Fitzgerald wrote a poem, predicting the speedy destruction of Buonaparté and his being "*hurled headlong to the shades be-*"*low.*" What a mortification, therefore, to find that the most noble hero is come back without having, as far as we know, done *any thing at all.*——The most noble hero set out, it will be remembered, just at the time when, building our hopes upon the base fabrications about the *battle of Aspern*, we, every day, expected to hear of Napoleon's *complete overthrow*, an expectation in which, doubtless, the most noble personage participated. Such was the time when our Hindostan Conqueror sallied forth for Spain. *What a time is it*, under *what circumstances* is it, that he comes back? Answer that question yourself, reader; but, it is a question very well worth answering, and I hope every man in England will answer it for himself.—— Reader, we have been, by the hireling prints, over and over again told, that the main purpose of the Marquis Wellesley's going to Spain, was *to bring about a change in the government of Spain;* and these prints have not failed to accuse the Junta of obstinacy, folly, and, sometimes, of treasonable intentions, because they refused to adopt the change which the most noble Marquis proposed to them.—— Very well; and now, pray look back to the Debates of the last Session, upon Spanish affairs; there you will find Mr. Whitbread blaming the ministers for having hazarded so much English blood and so much English treasure without first seeing, that the government of Spain meant to give the people motives for fighting; and there you will find the ministers telling Mr. Whitbread, *that it did not become them to interfere in forming a government for Spain.* What think you, then, of their *sincerity?* They even affected to reproach Mr. Whitbread, for saying that they ought to have seen that the government was such as it would have been wisdom to support. No: they were for leaving the Spaniards wholly to themselves. Very nice in their notions upon such matters. So nice, that they would rather fail in their enterprizes, than suffer any under their authority to meddle with the work of government-making in Spain. But, now, if the hired prints tell us truth, the Marquis Wellesley was sent out by these very ministers *for the express purpose of effecting a change in the government.*——Of the nature of that change we were informed. We were told, that the Marquis proposed a *Regency*. The Junta, however, did not approve of this. They liked power as well as other people; and, besides, there was the dread of Napoleon to be set against the eloquence of the Marquis. Is it not likely that the Junta were pretty nearly as wise as the Marquis Wellesley? At any rate, he failed; no change in the government has taken place upon his recommendation; and, no change, in all probability, will take place.——I wonder whether the most noble Marquis walked over the *French flag* again, when he came on board ship? His brother of Douro had no French flag, I believe, to send him from *Talavera?* Oh! that flag scene! That flag scene! I shall never be happy till I see it represented upon the stage. Well, we may see it yet.——In the meanwhile, the Marquis is, it seems, to be Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. Aye, he is to fill *Mr. Canning's place;* aye, the place of that very person, who endeavoured to put the Marquis in the place of Lord Castlereagh, but who, in the attempt, got ousted himself!

Mr. Canning.——This poor gentleman is almost an object of pity, even with me, who know him so well. He is the only man that I know of, in the world, not to be pitied in a similar case; under such very dismal circumstances.——His long exculpatory Epistle I have, by way of *rubbing off an old score with him*, inserted below, word for word and letter for letter. The Statesman news-paper has, I see, not

published it, thinking it too *contemptible;* but, it is for that very reason that it ought to send it over the world, that the world may see what a fall upstart arrogance has received. Never was there so dull, so stupid, so despicable a publication. One can make neither head nor tail of it. You may begin at the bottom as well as at the top. It is a mass of unmeaning verbosity that may have been equalled, but that never was surpassed, even by *the dispatches from Hindostan.*——Mr. Canning is not one of those who can be merry under all circumstances. Like the fellow in Congreve's Old Bachelor, he is nothing without his *back.* What is become of all his Anti-Jacobin wit and waggery? "Where are his gibes now? Not one "left?" Would that *John Hookham, the Marquis of the Union,* were here to assist him!——Out of the heap of lumber, however, comes a confirmation of the fact, that my Lord Castlereagh was treated with *insincerity unparalleled.* Be he what he may; much as he has to answer to the nation, he ought to have been treated fairly, and especially by those who were his colleagues in office; who were sharers in all that he did.——But, all this is nothing, when one thinks of the manner, in which the *country* has been treated by this ministry, a great part of whom, at any rate, now stand accused, *by one of their colleagues,* of having left to fill, during six months, the most important post in the government, a minister whom *they thought unfit for that post.* Upon this part of the subject; upon the injury and insult our country has received upon this occasion, I here beg leave to introduce an extract from the TIMES of the 29th of November, the honour of writing which I envy the author:——"The facts, as "stated in this defence, though more mi- "nutely specified, agree very well with "those before advanced by Lord Castle- "reagh. His Lordship, however, sup- "poses his dismissal to have been settled at "the beginning of April. The defence "avers, that the intrigue for procuring it "only commenced then, and was termi- "nated on the 28th, and then imme- "diately communicated to Lord Cam- "den, who acquiesced in the propriety "" of a change in Lord Castlereagh's "" situation," provided (and here first "occurs a phrase that will long live in "public derision) *provided* "it *could be* "" *reconciled to his* LORDSHIP'S FEELINGS." "So that we have, in April, on the part "of Lord Castlereagh's friend, an ac- "knowledgment that his Lordship is un- "fit for his situation: which situation he "is nevertheless suffered to retain for "five months afterwards: to plan and "conduct an Expedition, unparalleled "in the misery, and disgrace, and ruin "resulting from it. And why is he suf- "fered to do this? Because the sensitive "youth, as the no-less-sensitive Lord "Camden imagines, cannot "*reconcile it* "" *to his feelings to go out.*" Who can "think, without shuddering, that the in- "dependence of this land, when assailed "by so hardy a ruffian as BUONAPARTE, "should have been intrusted to the guar- "dianship of such a set of sentimental "men-milliners as these? Reconcile it "to his feelings, indeed! Has the nation "no feelings? and, if it has, how have "they been harrowed up by the inde- "scribable miseries of the Walcheren "Expedition? No timid girl, in the "last stage of consumption—no con- "demned malefactor, when about to sus- "tain the final sentence of the law, ever "entertained so dire an apprehension of "the terrors of their situation, as his MA- "JESTY'S Ministers conceived must ago- "nize the heart of LORD CASTLEREAGH, "when warned of *the approaching end* "of his Ministry. "Time is to be taken," "as it is said in another part of the de- "fence, "by his friends to prepare him "" *for the change.*" The *mollia tempora* "*fandi* are to be selected, lest his delicate "frame should sink under the awful dis- "closure! With what laughter and "buffoonery did the town yesterday "read this exquisite nonsense!—Such, "then, being the difficulties in making "the dreadful communication, it appears, "that divers expedients were devised, in "order to remove the necessity of it, and "to preserve Lord Castlereagh's "feelings" "unruffled; and here we believe one ge- "neral sentiment of indignation must "pervade the land, on the discovery "made by a Member of the last Admi- "nistration, of the universal impotence "of the whole body to which he be- "longed; they could not even agree upon "and execute a plan of this narrow and "contemptible nature. On the 8th of "June, (says Mr. Canning,)

I. "" An arrangement was stated to "" me, which had for its object a new "" distribution of the business of the War "" Department; on the 13th, I signified "" my acquiescence in that arrangement, "" so far as I was concerned."

II. " " But, on the 18th, another ar-
" " rangement was stated to me, as in-
" " tended to be substituted for that in
" " which I had acquiesced; but again—

III. " " On the 21st, it was announced
" " to me, that the first arrangement was
" " finally decided upon, and was to be
" " immediately carried into effect."

IV. " " And lastly, on the 5th of July,
" " a new plan was stated to me to be in
" " contemplation; and this plan was, on
" " the 13th, announced to me as settled,
" " and as intended to be substituted for
" " that which had been first proposed."—

" Four different arrangements, resolved " and unresolved upon, in the space of as " many weeks, which at last end in " executing no arrangement whatever!! " How one's blood boils to think that the " affairs of our country have been consign- " ed to the absolute impotence of such " men as these! And much as we have " suffered under their Councils, and cruel- " ly as we have been aggrieved by their " incompetence—incompetence did we " say? No! no word that language ever " contained can describe this, their unre- " deemed nothingness, as here detailed by " one of themselves. Yet, much as we " have suffered under them, how thank- " ful ought we to be that we have " really been found to exist at the close of " such an Administration! We call upon " Mr. Perceval to say, as he now aspires " to the situation from whence that great " decider of strifes has removed his prede- " cessor, whether he was privy to these " arrangements, four times disarranged, and " terminating in no arrangement at all? " How Mr. Canning could have the con- " fidence thus to blazon the incapacity of " his colleagues, thus to unfold the secrets " of his prison-house, we know not; but " we confess that the tale he has revealed, " does indeed freeze our very blood. " Was Antwerp captured, and the French " Fleet destroyed, by resolutions four " times taken, by plans four times formed, " and at last ending in no plan? Oh " yes, the same energy and decision " marked the public and the private " councils of these unhappy men. But " the latter burthened us with no expence; " in them no lives perished, by them no " disgrace was incurred, except what has " now fallen upon the authors of them, " from this their exposure. Their public " projects present a different result, and " more calamitous consequences. Yes, it " was indeed by firmness and resolution " like these that Antwerp was taken, and " the fleet destroyed, without the waste " of a moment's time; it was by vigour " and decision such as these, that to day " it was determined to evacuate Walche- " ren, and to-morrow to retain it—this " moment to build barracks, and the next " to destroy the fortifications; while our " poor troops—but tears enough have " been shed on their account already. " Yet how will Mr. Canning look his re- " cent colleagues in the face, after this " his promulgation of their resolutions, *four* " *times formed and revoked within a month,* " *and at last ending in nothing?* How will " they feel towards the man who has thus " exposed both himself and them to public " scorn and derision? Four arrangements " in four weeks have these sons of sapience " formed; and yet have not they been " able to rescue the Ministry which they " composed from dissolution! Yet the " powers of ridicule are lost upon a sub " ject so base; and the source of grief has " been already dried up by the more preg- " nant and ruinous evils which have " drawn upon it during their Administra- " tion. We must, therefore, cease. But " how an atom of them should dare linger " in office after a statement so destructive " of their credit as this, and from one of " their own body, too, we cannot easily " conceive."——This is all so just, and, at the same time, so excellently well expressed, that it leaves nothing to be added to it. It is hardly to exaggerate to say, that Buonaparté must be disposed to pity us, to see us in such hands. Good God! That a nation so full of well-informed men; so full of learning and of talents of all sorts; so full of bravery when opposed to a foreign foe; that this nation should be thus treated by such men as are here, in this writing of Canning, exhibited upon the stage! To see the King, too, time after time, teazed, baited, insulted with the tender of this man's resignation! There is really something in it too monstrous to be endured.—— The *exposure*, however, is valuable. It is another instance of the necessity of that change of system, that constitutional reform and renovation, without which, it must now be evident to every one, this kingdom cannot be saved.

WM. COBBETT.

Botley, 30 *Nov.* 1809.

LETTERS

FROM THE

RIGHT HON. GEO. CANNING

TO

THE EARL CAMDEN,

Lord President of The Council.

Gloucester Lodge, Nov. 14, 1809.

My Lord—I had written to your Lordship immediately after the publication of your Lordship's Statement;* but I delayed sending my letter, in the hope of being able previously to submit it to the perusal of the Duke of Portland.

In this hope I have been disappointed by that fatal event, which has deprived this country of one of its most upright and disinterested Patriots; the King, of one of his most faithful, devoted, and affectionate subjects; and the world, of one of the most blameless and most noble-minded of men.

Thus situated, I have thought it right to revise what I had written, and scrupulously to expunge every reference to the authority of the Duke of Portland, which would now stand upon my sole testimony; retaining such only as are supported, either by written documents which I shall be happy to communicate to your Lordship; or by facts which are well known to your Lordship or to your Colleagues, and in which for the most part your Lordship is yourself concerned.

Neither, however, can I content myself with this precaution; but must protest, at the same time, in the most earnest manner, against any possible misconstruction, by which any thing in the following Letter can be strained to a meaning unfavourable to the motives which actuated the Duke of Portland's conduct.

It is impossible, indeed, not to regret the policy, however well intentioned, which dictated the reserve practised towards Lord Castlereagh in the beginning of this transaction; or that practised towards myself in its conclusion.

It is to be regretted, that the Duke of Portland should have imposed, and that your Lordship should have accepted, the condition of silence, in the first communications between you.

It is also to be regretted, that I should not have learnt in July, that your Lordship was not party to the assurances then given to me on behalf of Lord Castlereagh's friends in general;—and that another Member of the Cabinet, comprehended in that description, had (as I have since heard), refused to concur in them.

Had I been made acquainted with these circumstances, I should then have resigned; and my Resignation would, at that time, have taken place without inconvenience or embarrassment; and without stirring those questions (no way connected with the causes of my retirement) or subjecting me to those misinterpretations of my conduct and motives, which have been produced by the coincidence of my resignation with that of the Duke of Portland.

But, however this reserve may be to be regretted, it is impossible to attribute the adoption of it, on the part of the Duke of Portland, to any other motives than to that gentleness of nature which eminently distinguished him; and which led him to endeavour (above all things) to prevent political differences from growing into personal dissentions; and to aim at executing whatever arrangement might be expedient for improving or strengthening the Administration, with the concurrence (if possible) of all its existing Members.

And no man who knows the affectionate respect and attachment, which the manly and generous qualities of the Duke of Portland's mind were calculated to command, and which I invariably bore to him, will suspect me of being willing to establish my own vindication, at the expence of the slightest disrespect to his memory, or prejudice to his fame.—I have the honour to be, My Lord; Your Lordship's most obedient humble Servant,

George Canning.

TO THE EARL CAMDEN, &c. &c. &c.

My Lord—The Statement, which has been published in the newspapers, in your Lordship's name, has decided a question on which I had before been hesitating, as to the necessity of an authentic detail of the transactions (so far as I am concerned in them or am acquainted with them) to which that Statement refers.

For that purpose, I think a direct address to your Lordship more decorous, both towards your Lordship and for myself, than an anonymous paragraph in a newspaper.

* For the Statement, see p. 861.

It is with the most painful reluctance that I recur to a subject, which, so far as it concerns Lord Castlereagh and myself, had been settled in a manner, which is usually, I believe, considered as final.

Discussions of the causes of dispute more commonly precede, than follow, the extreme appeal to which Lord Castlereagh resorted:—And when, after mature consideration, his Lordship had determined to resort to that appeal in the first instance, I should have thought that such a choice, deliberately made, would have been felt by his friends to be equally conclusive upon them, as upon himself.

But your Lordship needs not to be informed, how assiduously my character has been assailed by writers in the news-papers, espousing Lord Castlereagh's quarrel, and supposed (I trust, most injuriously) to be his Lordship's particular friends.

The perversions and misrepresentations of anonymous writers, however, would not have extorted from me any reply. But to them succeeded the publication of Lord Castlereagh's Letter to me of the 19th of September. *

I entirely disbelieve that Lord Castlereagh, and I distinctly deny that I myself, had any knowledge of this publication.

But, by what means it matters not, the Letter is before the world: and though the course originally chosen by Lord Castlereagh precluded me from offering any explanation to him, the course which has since been adopted on his behalf (though undoubtedly without his privity), might perhaps have been considered as rendering such an explanation due to myself. It is, however, only since your Lordship's publication that I have felt it to be indispensably necessary.

The Statement on my behalf, which has also found its way (without my consent and against my wish) into the public papers, was written under a sense of delicacy and restraint as to the particulars of the transaction, which, from the character of the transaction itself, must always continue to prevail in a great degree; but from which, until Wednesday, the 11th of October, the day on which I gave up the seals, I had not an opportunity of soliciting any dispensation.

Of the indulgence which I then most humbly solicited, I trust I shall be able to avail myself sufficiently for my own vindication, without losing sight of those considerations of duty and propriety, by which the use of such an indulgence must necessarily be regulated and confined.

It is stated in Lord Castlereagh's Letter, "That I had demanded and procured from the Duke of Portland, before the rising of Parliament, a promise for Lord Castlereagh's removal from the War Department; that, by this promise, Lord Castlereagh's situation, as a Minister of the Crown, was made dependent upon my pleasure; and that this promise I afterwards thought myself entitled to enforce;"

"That, after and notwithstanding this virtual supersession of Lord Castlereagh in his office, I allowed him to originate and conduct the Expedition to the Scheldt;"

"And that, during this whole period, I knew that the agitation, and the decision of the question for his removal, were concealed from him: and was party to this concealment."

Lord Castlereagh indeed admits,

That he "has no right as a public man, to resent my demanding, upon public grounds, his removal from his office, or even from the Administration, as a condition of my continuing a member of the Government."

But he contends, that a proposition, "justifiable in itself," ought not to have been "executed in an unjustifiable manner:" and he makes me responsible for the manner in which the "Head of the Administration," and some Members of the Government, "*supposed* to be his (Lord Castlereagh's) friends," executed the proposition which he attributes to me."

He is ready to acknowledge, indeed, "that I pressed for a disclosure, at the same time that I pressed for a decision; and that the disclosure was resisted by the Duke of Portland and his (Lord Castlereagh's) *supposed* friends."

But, in this circumstance, Lord Castlereagh professes not to see any justification of what he conceives to have been my conduct towards him; because, by acquiescing in the advice or intreaties of his "supposed friends," I admitted "an authority" on their part, "which I must have known them not to possess;" because, by "pressing for disclosure," I shewed my own sense of the "unfairness" of concealment; and because, with that sense, I "ought" (as he conceives me not to have done) "to have availed myself of the same alternative, namely, my own Resignation, to enforce disclosure, which I did to enforce decision."

* See Reg. Oct. 14, p. 516.

Without offering a single word in the way of argument, I shall, by a distinct detail of facts in the order of their date, substantiate my contradiction of these charges.

I shall only premise,

1st, That I had (as is admitted by Lord Castlereagh) an unquestionable right to require, on public grounds, a change in the War Department, tendering at the same time the alternative of my own Resignation.

2dly. (What no man at all acquainted with the course of public business will dispute), That the regular, effectual, and straight-forward course for bringing that alternative to issue, was to state it directly to the "Head of the Administration," the King's chief Minister, to be laid by that Minister before the King.

I proceed to the detail of facts.

In the beginning of April, (the 2d) I addressed a letter to the Duke of Portland, containing a representation on the state of his Administration, and expressing my wish and intention, unless some change were effected in it, to resign.

(April 4th to 8th).—Upon the Duke of Portland's requiring a more detailed explanation as to the motives of my profferred Resignation, I stated, among other things, that a change either in my own department, or in Lord Castlereagh's, appeared to me to be expedient for the public service—I stated my perfect willingness that the alternative should be decided for my retirement; and only requested that the decision might, (if possible) take place before the recommencement of business in Parliament after the Easter holidays.

The Duke of Portland requested me to suspend the execution of my intention to resign: wishing to have an opportunity of consulting with some of our colleagues, before he determined what advice to lay before the King.

The Easter holidays thus passed away. On the 10th of April, shortly after his Grace's return to town from Bulstrode, the Duke of Portland opened the subject to one of the Members of the Cabinet, whose name, (not having been hitherto brought forward,) I do not think it necessary to mention. Your Lordship is perfectly acquainted with it.

By the Duke of Portland's desire, I had a communication with that Member of the Cabinet, within a very few days after his interview with the Duke of Portland. He strongly represented the difficulty of making any new Arrangement during the sitting of Parliament; and urged me to defer the pressing my own resignation till the end of the Session. To this recommendation I did not promise to accede: but we agreed (whether upon his suggestion or upon mine, I am not confident) that, at all events, no step whatever could properly be taken, until after the decision of the question upon the Writership; which was about this time brought forward in the House of Commons.

That question was decided on Tuesday the 25th of April.

On Friday, the 28th, the Duke of Portland communicated fully with your Lordship; and informed me as the result of that communication, that your Lordship thought a change in Lord Castlereagh's situation in the Government desirable,—provided it could be effected honourably for Lord Castlereagh, and that it "could be reconciled to Lord Castlereagh's feelings."

From this period, I understood that your Lordship was constantly consulted by the Duke of Portland in every step of the transaction. Other Members of the Cabinet were also consulted by the Duke of Portland; but how many of them, or at what precise periods, I neither knew at the time, nor can now undertake to say.

Shortly after your Lordship's first interview with the Duke of Portland, (I am sure before the 5th of May) that Member of the Cabinet with whom his Grace had first communicated, reported to me a suggestion of your Lordship's of a change of office for Lord Castlereagh, evidently calculated on the principles which your Lordship had stated as indispensable to such a change. Whether this communication to me was in the nature of a direct message from your Lordship, I do not exactly know. But I understood distinctly that you knew of its being made to me; and that whatever observations I might make upon it, was to be reported to your Lordship. What I observed upon it, was in substance,—that it was not for me to presume to say what change would be proper; that I had done all that I had thought myself either called upon or at liberty to do, in stating to the Duke of Portland my opinions, and my intention to resign; that the Duke of Portland alone could either propose any change or obtain the necessary authority for carry-

ing it into effect; and that I therefore recommended that your Lordship should state your suggestion to the Duke of Portland.

On the 5th of May the Duke of Portland informed me, that he had determined to lay the whole subject, on the following Wednesday, before his Majesty.

On Wednesday the 10th of May, he informed me that he had done so; and that his Majesty had been graciously pleased to say, that he would take the subject into his serious consideration.

On Wednesday, the 31st of May, apprehending it to be possible, that my intention might not have been fully explained to his Majesty, and thinking it my duty to leave no doubt upon it, I humbly repeated to his Majesty the representations which I had before made to the Duke of Portland, and humbly tendered my Resignation. I received thereupon his Majesty's gracious commands, to retain my situation until his Majesty should have considered the whole subject.

Some time in the course of the next week, I think on the 8th of June, the Duke of Portland stated to me, that he had received his Majesty's commands, to propose, and to carry into effect at the end of the Session of Parliament, an Arrangement for a partial change in the War Department.

The particulars of this Arrangement I do not think it proper to detail; feeling it my duty to limit myself strictly to what is absolutely necessary for the explanation of my own conduct. It is sufficient to state, that the object of this Arrangement was not the removal of Lord Castlereagh, but a new distribution of the business of the War Department, whereby that part of it which was connected with political correspondence, would have been transferred to the Foreign Office; and the business of another office, then vacant, would have been transferred to Lord Castlereagh. It is only necessary to add, that the effect of this new distribution would not have been to take out of Lord Castlereagh's hands the superintendance of the Expedition to the Scheldt.

On the 13th of June, I wrote to the Duke of Portland, signifying to him that, although such an Arrangement had never entered into my contemplation, and although I did not think it calculated to remedy all the difficulties which had induced me to bring the state of the Administration under his Grace's consideration, I was ready, so far as I was concerned, to undertake and discharge to the best of my ability, any duty which his Majesty might be graciously pleased to devolve upon me; but I expressed at the same time, great doubts, whether this Arrangement could be expected to be acceptable to Lord Castlereagh, or, in all its parts, satisfactory to the public feeling.

On Sunday the 18th of June, (Parliament being expected to rise on the 20th or 21st) I wrote to the Duke of Portland, to enquire whether this Arrangement, or any other, was to take place; stating to him that, "if things remained as they then were, I was determined not to remain in office."

(June 18th.)—In answer the Duke of Portland mentioned to me a new Plan of Arrangement, altogether different from that which he had been authorised to carry into effect; and stated that he had sent for your Lordship and the other Member of the Cabinet with whom your Lordship and the Duke of Portland had been in constant communication, to cooperate with him in forwarding this new Plan, and to urge Lord Castlereagh to consent to it.

The particulars of this new Plan, I do not think it necessary to state, as I learnt from the Duke of Portland, either the next day or the day following it, that to this Plan Lord Castlereagh certainly could not be brought to agree. Whether this was known to his Grace only from your Lordship, or through your Lordship from Lord Castlereagh himself, I was not apprized.

On Wednesday the 21st, the day of the rising of Parliament, I was assured by the Duke of Portland, that the specific Arrangement which he had in the first instance proposed, viz. the new distribution of the business of the War Department, should be carried into effect;—and that his Majesty had directed him to desire your Lordship to communicate his decision to Lord Castlereagh.

On Tuesday, June the 27th, finding that no communication had been yet made to Lord Castlereagh, I wrote to the Duke of Portland in terms of the strongest remonstrance, both against the concealment and the delay; and intimated my determination to recur to my original intention, and to press the acceptance of my Resignation.

Accordingly, on the following day,

Wednesday the 28th of June, I had an audience of the King, in which I humbly and earnestly repeated to his Majesty the tender of my Resignation.

That same evening, the Duke of Portland informed me that he had that day signified to your Lordship the King's desire, that your Lordship should communicate the intended Arrangement to Lord Castlereagh; and, that the communication was to be made by your Lordship as soon as the Expedition had sailed; which, it was expected, would be in less than a fortnight from that time.

But before this fortnight elapsed, viz on Wednesday the 5th of July, the Duke of Portland informed me, that in consideration of the difficulties attending the proposed Arrangement, he and those with whom he had consulted, were of opinion, that another should be substituted for it, which he trusted, would also be more agreeable to me. He told me that hopes were entertained that your Lordship would determine to offer your Resignation, for the purpose of facilitating a general Arrangement, in which a complete change in the War Department might be effected consistently with Lord Castlereagh's feelings. He said, however, that your Lordship had not yet finally made up your mind upon the subject:—but, that you would probably come to a decision before the following Wednesday.

The Duke of Portland stated his intention, in the event of your Lordship's resignation, to submit to his Majesty the nomination of Lord Wellesley to the War Department.

It was well known by the Duke of Portland, that I had been always anxious for Lord Wellesley's accession to the Cabinet, but this was the first mention to me, in the course of this transaction, of his introduction into the War Department.—But for a severe indisposition, Lord Wellesley would, before this time, have been on his way to Spain.

On Thursday the 13th of July, the Duke of Portland informed me, that your Lordship had, the day before, actually tendered your Resignation; but that your Lordship had annexed to it the conditions, that no change should take place till after the termination of the Expedition to the Scheldt; and that it should be left to your Lordship to choose the time of making any communication to Lord Castlereagh.

(July 13th to the 20th.)—I made the strongest remonstrances against this new delay, and this indefinite renewal of the concealment from Lord Castlereagh. I said that after the repeated postponements which had already taken place, and after the reserve which had already been practised towards Lord Castlereagh, I could not rely upon the execution of any Arrangement which should not be now completely settled in all its parts; and, if this were not to be done, I most earnestly intreated that his Majesty might be advised now to accept my Resignation.

The Duke of Portland most anxiously deprecated my Resignation, as leading, in his apprehension, to the dissolution of the Administration. He declared himself to be authorised to assure me, in the most solemn manner, that the Arrangement now in contemplation should positively take place at the termination of the Expedition; that the Seals of the War Department should then be offered to Lord Wellesley—an office (to be vacated by means of your Lordship's retirement), being at the same time to be offered to Lord Castlereagh;—and that in the interval, and without loss of time, Lord Castlereagh's friends should take opportunities of preparing him for the change, and reconciling him to it, by representing to him the great advantages to be derived from it, in the acquisition of additional strength to the Government.

Not only the Duke of Portland, but other Members of the Cabinet, Lord Castlereagh's friends, some directly and some through common friends, urged me, in the most earnest manner, to acquiesce in the postponement now proposed. It was represented to me, that if instead of pressing for the execution of the Arrangement now, time were allowed to Lord Castlereagh's friends to prepare him for the change, and to reconcile him to it, the Arrangement might ultimately take place in an amicable manner; that every public object might thus be answered, without any unnecessary harshness to the feelings of individuals; and that so far from finding fresh impediments raised to the execution of the Arrangement, when the time arrived, I should find all those, to whose representations I yielded, considering themselves pledged equally with the Duke of Portland, to see it carried into effect.

It is due to your Lordship to say, that your Lordship's name was not, so far as I recollect, specifically mentioned to me on this occasion; but it is equally due to myself to declare, that I never for a mo-

ment imagined, nor could have believed, that the general description of "Lord Castlereagh's friends," as stated to me without exception or qualification by the Duke of Portland, did not comprehend your Lordship, whose proffered Resignation was the basis of the whole Arrangement, and without whose express consent, therefore, no other person could announce the Arrangement to Lord Castlereagh.

By these representations and assurances, at length, (July 20,) most reluctantly, and I confess against my better judgment, I was induced to acquiesce in the proposed postponement of the change; and consented to remain in office till the termination of the Expedition.

On Saturday September the 2d, the result of the Expedition to the Scheldt being then known, I wrote to the Duke of Portland, at Bulstrode, reminding his Grace, that the period fixed for offering the Seals of the War Department to Lord Wellesley, was arrived.

On the following Wednesday the 6th of September, the Duke of Portland informed me, that no steps whatever had been taken by any of Lord Castlereagh's friends, to reconcile him to the change, or to prepare him for it; that the execution of the Arrangement would be attended with other Resignations, or at least with one other Resignation, (of which I had never before received the slightest intimation); and that he had himself determined to retire.

Upon receiving this intelligence, I immediately disclaimed any wish that the Arrangement, however positively I understood it to have been settled, should be carried into effect under circumstances to me so unexpected; and instantly reverted to that "alternative" which, upon each successive stage of difficulties and delays, I had uniformly pressed,—that of the tender of my own Resignation;—which I desired the Duke of Portland to lay that day before the King.

On the following day, Thursday the 7th of September, I declined attending the Cabinet; stating in a letter to the Duke of Portland, (which I left it to his Grace to communicate to the Cabinet if he should think proper), that I considered my Resignation as in his Majesty's hands; and myself as holding my office only until my Successor should be named.

On Friday the 8th, I heard from the Duke of Portland that Lord Castlereagh had sent in his Resignation. I have been informed since, (but whether correctly or not I cannot affirm), that he did so, in consequence of a communication made to him, by your Lordship, after the Cabinet of the preceding day.

On Thursday the 14th of September, your Lordship called upon me at the Foreign Office, by your own appointment, for the purpose of explaining the causes which had prevented your making any communication to Lord Castlereagh in the earlier stages of the transaction.

On Tuesday, September 19th, your Lordship, in answer to a letter of mine of the preceding day, explained to me the grounds of your silence to Lord Castlereagh, during the latter period of the transaction.

On Wednesday morning, September the 20th, I received from Lord Castlereagh the letter, which produced our meeting.

From this series of facts it appears,

That, in April, I made a representation to the King's First Minister, on the general state of the Administration; and that, in the course of the discussions arising out of that representation, I proposed on public grounds, not, as Lord Castlereagh appears to have been informed, his removal from the Administration, but the alternative of a change, either in the War or Foreign Department;

That on the 10th of May, the Duke of Portland submitted to his Majesty the subject of my representation: and informed me that his Majesty would be pleased to take it into his consideration:

That, from the 10th of May until the 8th of June, I was wholly unapprized of the result of that consideration: but that, for fear of misapprehension, I had, in person, during that interval,—viz. on May 31,—humbly repeated my representation, and tendered my Resignation to his Majesty;

That, on or about the 8th of June, for the first time, an arrangement was stated to me, which had for its object a new distribution of the business of the War Department, and that, on the 13th, I signified my acquiescence in that arrangement, so far as I was concerned;

That, on the 18th, another arrangement was stated to me, as intended to be substituted for that in which I had acquiesced: but that, on the 21st, it was announced to me that the first arrangement was finally decided upon; was to be immediately carried into effect; and was to be communicated to Lord Castlereagh by your Lordship;

That, on the 27th of June, no step appearing to have been taken, either to execute the intended Arrangement, or to apprise Lord Castlereagh of it, I remonstrated against the delay, and against the concealment from Lord Castlereagh: and that, on the 28th, I again tendered my resignation; and that on the same day your Lordship received an injunction to communicate the intended arrangement to Lord Castlereagh;

That, on the 5th of July, a new plan was stated to me to be in contemplation; a plan originating with your Lordship, and depending for its execution upon a step to be taken by yourself: that this plan was, on the 13th, announced to me as settled, and as intended to be substituted for that which had been first proposed;

That I at that time renewed my remonstrances in the strongest manner, both against the delay and against the concealment; but that it was stated to me to be an indispensable condition of this plan on your Lordship's part,—that it should not be acted upon till the termination of the Expedition to the Scheldt; and that the time of making the communication to Lord Castlereagh should be left to your Lordship's discretion;

That, at length, in compliance with the representations and intreaties of the Duke of Portland, and of others, Lord Castlereagh's friends, and upon the most solemn assurances that Lord Castlereagh should in the mean time be prepared by his friends for the change, and that the change should positively take place at the period fixed by your Lordship, I consented to remain in office;

That on Wednesday the 6th of September, finding that nothing had been done towards preparing Lord Castlereagh for the arrangement; and that the execution of it would be attended with difficulties of which I had not before been apprised, I desired the Duke of Portland to lay my Resignation before the King.

Your Lordship will therefore perceive,

That up to the 8th of June, so far from being in possession of any "promise for Lord Castlereagh's removal," and from his continuance in office being made thereby "dependent upon my pleasure;"—no decision whatever had, to my knowledge, been taken, up to that time; no proposal had been made to me by the Duke of Portland, in any way affecting Lord Castlereagh's political situation; and no intimation had been given to me, whether my own Resignation would be finally accepted or declined;

That the Arrangement which was in contemplation from the 8th of June to the 5th of July, in no degree affected, and was never intended to affect, "the conduct of the Expedition to the Scheldt;"

That Lord Castlereagh's "removal from the War Department" was first determined upon as part of the plan of which your Lordship's Resignation was the basis;

That his "removal from the Administration" was not at any time "demanded" by me;

And, lastly, that I *did* employ the tender of my own Resignation, not to "enforce decision" *only* (as Lord Castlereagh's Letter supposes), but equally to "enforce disclosure;" and that in fact I did ultimately resign, rather than "enforce" the intended change, under circumstances so different from those which I had been authorised to expect.

It cannot be expected that I should labour very anxiously to refute the charge of my having "*supposed*" your Lordship and others "*to be* Lord Castlereagh's *friends;*" and having, under that impression, deferred to your opinion and "authority," in a matter affecting Lord Castlereagh's interests and feelings.

That your Lordship, in particular, as well from near connection as from an active and anxious partiality, was entitled to consultation, and to deference on such an occasion;—is a persuasion which I felt in common, as I believe, with every Member of the Government; and which not even Lord Castlereagh's disclaimer has induced me to renounce.

I should not have been surprised, nor should I have thought myself entitled to take the smallest offence, if your Lordship had, instead of concurring in the expediency of a change in Lord Castlereagh's department, protested against it, and had recommended to the Duke of Portland, to advise the King to accept my resignation: and it was perfectly known by the Duke of Portland, and I am confident, not unknown by your Lordship, that, at any moment from the beginning of these discussions to the end, I was not only ready but desirous to terminate them by resigning.

But when the opinion of the expediency of a change in the War Department, had been adopted by so many of the immediate friends of Lord Castlereagh, upon the condition that it should be reconciled to Lord Castlereagh's feelings, and when they and your Lordship among the first,

had devised and concerted with the King's First Minister the mode of carrying that object into execution, I cannot help thinking that I should have been much, and justly, blamed, if I had insisted upon taking the communication to Lord Castlereagh out of your hands into my own.

I now come to your Lordship's Statement. That Statement is as follows—

"As it may be inferred, from a Statement which has appeared in the public papers, that Lord Camden withheld from Lord Castlereagh a communication which he had been desired to make to him, it is necessary that it should be understood, that however Mr. Canning might have conceived the communication alluded to, to have been made to Lord Camden, it was never stated to Lord Camden, that the communication was made at the desire of Mr. Canning; and, so far from Lord Camden having been authorized to make the communication to Lord Castlereagh, he was absolutely restricted from so doing.

"As it may also be inferred that Lord Camden was expected to prepare Lord Castlereagh's mind for any proposed change, it is necessary that it should be understood, that Lord Camden never engaged to communicate to Lord Castlereagh any circumstances respecting it, before the termination of the Expedition."
—Morning Chronicle, Oct. 19th.

This Statement appears to me to have been much misunderstood. It has been construed, as if your Lordship had meant to aver that what you were *restricted from doing* and what you *had not engaged to do*, were one and the same thing:—whereas your Lordship's Statement, in point of fact, contains two distinct propositions, and refers to two separate periods of time.

The period during which your Lordship states yourself to have been "*absolutely restricted*" from making a communication to Lord Castlereagh, extends from the 28th of April, on which day the first communication was made by the Duke of Portland to your Lordship, to the time at which the proposed Arrangement, for the new distribution of the business of the War Department was superseded by your Lordship's tender of your Resignation.

The period during which your Lordship states yourself "*not to have engaged*" to make a communication to Lord Castlereagh, extends from the time of the tender of your Lordship's Resignation to the termination of the Expedition to the Scheldt.

It ought, however, to be observed, that during the first of these two periods,—from the 28th of April to the 12th of July,—the nature of the communication to be made to Lord Castlereagh, and the nature of the restriction imposed upon your Lordship, were entirely changed.

Previously to the 8th of June—the communication which your Lordship would have had to make to Lord Castlereagh, was simply that I had represented the expediency of a change either in his Department or in mine; and that *no* decision whatever had yet been taken upon this representation.

With respect to *this* communication, it does appear that the restriction upon your Lordship was absolute and indefinite.—But I knew nothing of it's existence.

Subsequently to the 8th of June, the communication to be made to Lord Castlereagh was, that an Arrangement was in contemplation for a new distribution of the business of the War Department.

With respect to *this* communication, not only was the *restriction* upon your Lordship not indefinitely continued; but your Lordship actually received on the 28th of June an *injunction to make this communication* to Lord Castlereagh at a period distinctly specified, viz. the sailing of the Expedition. And this injunction was only superseded by a voluntary act of your Lordship's—your render of your own Resignation on the 12th of July as the basis of another Arrangement.

During the whole of the period, from the 28th of April to the 12th of July, the concealment practised towards Lord Castlereagh was either without my knowledge and contrary to my belief, or it was against my earnest remonstrances.

It was without my knowledge and contrary to my belief, up to the week in which Parliament rose; and from that time forth it was against my earnest remonstrances.

Even when I learnt, in June, that the communication had not been made by your Lordship to Lord Castlereagh, I did not learn that you had been prevented from making it by any absolute restriction.

It was not till the month of July, in the course of the discussions which took place from the 13th to the 20th of that month, respecting the proposal for postponing the new arrangement to be founded on your Lordship's resignation, and for leaving to your Lordship's discretion the time of

disclosure to Lord Castlereagh, that I learnt that the silence which you had hitherto observed towards him, had been imposed upon your Lordship by the injunction of the Duke of Portland. I did not till then know with whom the concealment hitherto practised had originated; I frankly own that I thought it had originated with your Lordship; I was anxious above all things that it should not be ever suspected that it had originated with me; or that I had been a consenting party to it, or even (till a late period) conscious of its existence.

In my correspondence with the Duke of Portland at this period, therefore, at the same time that I resisted the new delay then proposed, I disclaimed any concurrence in the concealment which had been hitherto practised—and requested "that it might be remembered hereafter, whenever that concealment should be alledged against *me*, as an act of injustice to Lord Castlereagh, that it did not originate in *my* suggestion, that so far from desiring it, I had conceived (however erroneously) *your Lordship* to be the sure channel of communication to Lord Castlereagh; and that up to a very late period I had believed such communication to have been actually made."

The Duke of Portland, in answer, acknowledged my repeated remonstrances against the concealment; stating himself at the same time not to have been aware that I had at any time believed the communication to have been actually made; but assuring me "that he should be at all times ready to avow that the concealment had originated with himself, (the Duke of Portland); that he had *injoined it* to all those with whom he had communicated,—from motives which he was at all times ready to justify; and that he was desirous of taking whatever blame might have been, or might at any time be, incurred by it, upon himself."

This, as I have said, was my first knowledge of any restriction whatever upon your Lordship's communication to Lord Castlereagh.

If I am asked *why* I believed your Lordship to have *actually made* the communication, I answer, because it was natural that you should make it; because the expectation of your making it was the motive which induced me to desire (and I *did* desire) that the communication should be made to your Lordship;—because the manner in which you first received that communication (as reported to me by the Duke of Portland) tended to confirm the belief that your Lordship was the fit channel of communication to Lord Castlereagh;—and because I knew not of the existence of any impediment to your pursuing what appeared to me (and does still appear to me) the natural and obvious course to be pursued upon such an occasion.

If it be objected, that I ought not to have been contented with *presuming* the disclosure to have been made, but ought to have diligently ascertained that it was so;—first, I answer—that no person naturally sets about ascertaining that of which he entertains no doubt:—and, secondly, I answer—that the moment that my suspicion of the fact was excited, I did set about ascertaining the truth; and that upon ascertaining it, I did remonstrate in the strongest manner against the concealment;—and enforced that remonstrance by the tender of my own resignation.

It was on the 26th or 27th of June (five or six days after Parliament rose) that I discovered my suspicion to be founded.—On the 27th I remonstrated.—On the 28th I tendered my resignation.—And in the course of the same day, your Lordship (as I have already stated) received an injunction to make the communication as soon as the Expedition should have sailed.

The second of the two periods to which your Lordship's Statement refers, begins from the 12th of July, the day of the tender of your Lordship's Resignation.

It does not appear, nor does your Lordship's Statement aver, that at any time during the second period, the restriction which had been originally imposed upon your Lordship was renewed; or that any other existed, except that which your Lordship had imposed upon yourself, and which was therefore no longer binding upon your Lordship than while you might yourself be willing that it should bind you.

(To be continued.)

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